NYCC objects to the revocation of all orders the subject of this inquiry. The basis of objection is as described within section 2 of Mr Williams [`EW'] proof of evidence. Essentially NYCC objects on the grounds that revocation is premature at this point in time.

The effect of the orders is to protect a route upon which the Minister may build the bypass schemes for both Gargrave, and Hellifield and Long Preston ['HLP'].

The need and wish for bypass schemes around theses three villages has been long standing. Although of concern to residents prior to 1975, it was in that year that schemes were first formally considered by the government of the day.

Prior to the original orders being confirmed in the early 1990's, the government department promoted the two bypass schemes on a number of grounds. (For Gargrave – 1. traffic relief, 2. safety issues and 3. environmental conditions [NYCC 5 p.15]; for HLP – 1. traffic relief, 2. existing accident record, 3. substandard side roads and accesses, 4. narrow footways and 5. the tortuous road alignment [NYCC pp. 3.5-3.8 and 3.24].)

The Case promoted by the Government department was that these bypass schemes would significantly reduce the above problems. In particular, that traffic flow through Gargrave would, as a result of the schemes, reduce by 70% [NYCC 5 pp.32], and through HLP by 80-90% [NYCC 6 pp.3.24], with Mr Hornigold ('JH') at this inquiry confirming that relief in his view would be `at least 90%'. Further, it was promoted that the bypasses would significantly reduce accident risk. For example, in the case of HLP, the bypass was expected to reduce accidents by 600-850 over a 30 year period [NYCC 6 pp.3.27].

The Secretary of State confirmed the original orders, confirmed the need for the bypasses and confirmed the benefits which were expected to flow from the schemes.

Since that point in time matters have only become worse. The accident rate has increased on the A65 and confirmed by JH that certain sections of the A65 have `very bad accident records'. Traffic counts also indicate that traffic flows have increased by approximately 7% since the original orders were confirmed [EW table 4.1].

As acknowledged by JH, since the orders were confirmed, no significant improvements have been made to other original areas of concern such as the tortuous road alignment, sub-standard side roads and environmental conditions. As a result of the above, it is abundantly clear that there is still an apparent and pressing need for the bypass schemes. The HA proposals represent the only present firm solution to the villages' problems.

These schemes were seen as warranted and formed part of the government's building programme until 1998, when the subsidiary document [D14] to the white paper [D17], recommended the A65 be detrunked and the bypass schemes be withdrawn from the building programme. That decision was a policy decision and one which was part of a wider policy context. NYCC submits the decision was based predominantly upon economic grounds. However, the decision was a lawful decision, it is the current policy of the Government and we do not seek to argue against that policy decision. However, NYCC does suggest that there is a distinct possibility that the decision could be reversed and the schemes added to the building programme (now referred to as the Targeted Programme of Improvements (`TPI')).

It is acknowledged by all parties that the TPI is a `fluid' list; schemes may be added to the list and schemes may be removed from the list. D14 acknowledges that the majority of schemes within the TPI are bypass schemes [p.19] and that in some circumstances the only solution to traffic problems is to increase road capacity [p.35]. Subject to other factors and criteria these bypass schemes are precisely of the type which would be candidates for the TPI, in principle.

D14 also recognises that before any scheme can be considered for and included in the TPI a critical appraisal must be carried out, assessing all factors, all alternative options and priorities. At the time the original policy decision was made in 1998, these schemes had been the subject of NATA assessments and AST tables had been prepared [IN 6 and 7]. The information available to the decision maker at the time showed a benefit cost ratio [BCR] of 1.3 for Gargrave and 1.0 for HLP.

Since 1998 much further analysis and updating has been undertaken, e.g. In 2002 a study part funded by the HA [NYCC 7]; in 2004 a government funded update [NYCC 8] and the most recent COBA update in 2005 [IN 4], carried out by Jacobs Babtie on the instruction of NYCC.

The above works are precisely the type of works which should be carried out to keep schemes constantly under review and form part of the information required before a decision can be taken upon whether a scheme should be added to the TPI.

As already submitted, the TPI is a fluid list which is constantly under review. One can envisage the situation where new information has come to light or a change in circumstances has occurred which will mean that a scheme which previously was not considered acceptable for the TPI, becomes suitable. Such a change in circumstances has occurred here. As evidenced by the 2005 updated COBA assessment [IN 4].

Within the most recent COBA assessment the HA's scheme for Gargrave shows a BCR o 3.031 compared to 1.3 at the time of the original policy decision and for Hellifield & Long Preston shows a BCR of 1.584 compared to an original of 1.0. NYCC submits therefore that both schemes currently show significantly improved economic cases than were apparent when the Minister made the original decision.

It is accepted that the economic analysis is only part of the case that one needs to consider, however NYCC suggests, the economic viability and attractiveness of schemes forms a major part in most governments thinking! The above represents a substantial change from when the decision was originally taken and represents such a change in circumstances that it may warrant a change to that decision, so as to include these schemes on the TPI. If the above is accepted then it would be wrong to revoke the orders at this time as it can still be said there is a prospect of the schemes being built.

Even if it is not accepted that the schemes may be added, at this stage, to the TPI, the positive change in the economic case indicates that there is certainly a need for further investigation, into the other factors, to take place. Indeed, JH in xx stated that the most up to date information currently available was not sufficient to make a fully informed judgement as to the attractiveness of these schemes or otherwise. If that is accepted, it cannot be right to revoke the orders at a stage when the HA accept further work is required to be undertaken before one can make the judgement on suitability; that would surely be premature.

Notwithstanding that NYCC consider the schemes could be added to the TPI, if they were not, it is submitted that the schemes could still be carried out by the HA as they are works warranted upon safety grounds (such policy set out at D14 p.23). As noted above, the A65 has a very bad accident record and the bypass schemes, when originally assessed, were expected to substantially reduce that record although all parties accept that more current analysis would be needed to gain a more up to date view. Again, to revoke the orders before such work can be undertaken and a decision can be properly assessed would be to do so prematurely.

I will not at this point repeat the details of the `funding' arguments as it is clear that the parties agree, NYCC is `highly unlikely' to receive any sufficient funding to deal satisfactorily with the traffic problems on the A65. The above is important when one considers the natural endpoint of the Government's purpose. The stated intention of the government is to subsequently detrunk the A65 and hand over responsibility to NYCC. Indeed, it is clear from the HA's statement of case that they were under the misapprehension that these orders must be revoked before detrunking could occur. NYCC submit that this is the underlying reason for the draft orders and not that there is no prospect of the schemes being built.

Far more harm would be caused by the orders being revoked than if not. If theorders are revoked, Gargrave, Hellifield and Long Preston will effectively lose any possibility of attaining a solution to the very large traffic issues they face.        If the orders are not revoked and the route remains protected, there remains (as a result of the above) real possibility that funding solutions can be found and put into effect.

 NYCC therefore asks that the draft revocation orders are not confirmed.